Problemas del realismo – Georg Lukács El asalto a la razón. La trayectoria del irracionalismo desde Schelling hasta Hitler – Georg Lukács. by Lu ka qi; Georg Lukacs.; Wang jiu xing.;. Print book. Chinese El asalto a la razón: la trayectoria del irracionalismo by György Lukács · El asalto a la razón . (). Introduccion General a la Historia de Derecho. Barcelona, Gedisa. LESSIG , , , , , LUKACS, Georg. (). El asalto a la razon.

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It may be postulated as a general statement that the decline of bourgeois ideology set in with the end of the revolution. Of course we can find many latecomers oa especially in literature and art — for whose work this thesis by no means holds good we need only to mention Dickens and Keller, Courbet and Daumier.

These latter names apart, the period between and was rife with significant transitional figures who, while their work does reflect features of the decline, were in no wise party to it with regard to the central substance of their output e. Certainly the decline started much earlier in the sphere of theoretical learning, particularly economics and philosophy; bourgeois economics had produced nothing original and forward-looking since the demise of the Ricardo school in the s, while bourgeois philosophy had yielded nothing new since the demise of Hegelianism s and s.

Both these fields were completely dominated by capitalist apologetics. A similar situation obtained in the historical sciences. This in itself did not forestall a certain degeneration of general methodology, an increasingly reactionary slant in the bourgeois philosophy of natural sciences, and an ever-growing zeal in the use of their findings for the propagation of reactionary views. We are not now speaking of ideological evolution in Russia.

Here the year corresponded to in the West — and only twelve years afterwards came the socialist revolution. dazon

Only in the light of all these rzon are we entitled to claim — without losing a just sense of proportion — that the years marked another turning-point in the development of ideology.

In the first place, it was then that the rise of the great nation-states in Central Europe reached completion, and many of the most important demands of the bourgeois revolutions their fulfilment; at all events such revolutions had had their day in Western and Central Europe. Some very essential features of aswlto real bourgeois-revolutionary transformation were lacking in Germany and Italy to say nothing of Austria and Hungaryand there still existed very many relics of feudal absolutism, but from now on it was only thinkable that these could be liquidated through a revolution led by the proletariat.

And in those years, the proletarian revolution was already clearly delineated in the Paris Commune. Not only in a French but also in a European context, the battle of June in the revolution had already signified the turning-point.

Its occurrence strengthened the bond between the bourgeoisie and the reactionary classes, and its outcome sealed the fate of every democratic revolution of the period. After what was only a short pause, historically considered, the movements of the working-class masses acquired fresh life; in the First International was founded, and in the proletariat succeeded in gaining power, albeit only for a relatively short time and on a metropolitan scale: The ideological consequences of these events were very widespread.

The polemics of bourgeois science and philosophy were increasingly directed against the new enemy, socialism. While on the upsurge, bourgeois philosophy had challenged the feudal absolutist system, and the interpretation of this challenge had occasioned its grorg over objectives, whereas the chief enemy now was the proletarian world-view.

This, however, changed at once the subject and mode of expression of each and every reactionary philosophy.

When bourgeois society was a rising force, reactionary philosophy had defended feudal absolutism and subsequently the feudal remnants, the restoration. Grorg at the same time he remained on a par with the feudal reactionary, Schelling, inasmuch as what they both considered the chief enemy were the progressive tendencies of bourgeois philosophy: With the battle of June and with the Paris Commune in particular, reactionary polemics underwent a radical change of direction.

The Destruction of Reason by Georg Lukacs

On the one hand, there was asallto longer a progressive bourgeois philosophy to combat. Insofar as ideological disputes arose — and they figured prominently on the surface — they related primarily to differences of opinion as to how socialism could be disarmed most effectively, and to class differences asalfo the reactionary bourgeoisie. On the other hand, the principal foe had already appeared in theoretical as well as palpable form. True, the accordingly defensive character of bourgeois philosophy only had a slow and paradoxical influence.

But this tendency assumed a wholly distinctive form only after the first imperialist world war, and aa the victory of the great socialist October Revolution in Russia. In Nietzsche, of course, we perceive solely the initial stage of this development. But we can already confirm some important changes at this stage.


Although backward-looking inferences inevitably resulted from their critique, which was only partially accurate, their correct critical observations are of significance in the history of philosophy nonetheless. The situation was completely altered as soon as the enemy had become dialectical and historical materialism. Here bourgeois philosophy was no longer in a position to exercise a real critique, or even to understand correctly the target of its polemics.

All that it could do was either to polemicize — at first openly, later increasingly surreptitiously — against dialectics and materialism altogether, or else to play the demagogue in trying to establish a system of pseudo-dialectics by which to counteract genuine dialectics. Another point to consider is that the bourgeois philosophers ceased to possess any first-hand knowledge when the great arguments over objectives within the bourgeoisie abated. Schelling, Kierkegaard or Trendelenburg had still had an exact knowledge of Hegelian philosophy.

In criticizing Hegel without knowing him even superficially, Schopenhauer was once again a forerunner of bourgeois decadence. It seemed that when it came to opposing the class enemy, no holds were barred and all intellectual morality vanished. Scholars who were conscientious in other areas, only venturing to express themselves after accurately digesting their material, now permitted themselves the most facile assertions, which they had gleaned from other, similarly unfounded expressions of opinion.

Even when presenting facts they never thought of resorting to the actual sources. This further helps to explain why the ideological struggle against Marxism took place on an incomparably lower level than did, in its own day, the reactionary irrationalist critique of Hegelian dialectics. What Engels said of the lawyers is valid in an even acuter sense for philosophy: Philosophers know instinctively what is theirs to defend, and where the enemy lurks.

We exposed in our preceding chapter this kind of modern reactionary defence against philosophical progress and the dialectical method, and we traced the essence and methodology of modern irrationalism back to precisely this type of reaction. In the observations we have just made, we have likewise attempted to outline the social reasons for the radical change in the representation of the enemy, and how this change was registered philosophically. First we intend to moot the general possibility that for Nietzsche, as for the other philosophers of the age, socialism as a movement and world-view had become the chief opponent, and that only this change on the social front and its philosophical consequences enable us to portray his outlook in its true context.

With regard to the former, we have already touched on the most important social happenings of this period.

Another circumstantial factor — one favourable to his development — was that Nietzsche concluded his activity on the eve of the asalfo age. He witnessed the founding of the German Reich, the hopes that were pinned to it and their disappointment, the fall of Bismarck, and the inauguration by Wilhelm II of an overtly aggressive imperialism.

On the other hand, however, Nietzsche did not personally live to see the imperialist period. This mythical form furthered his influence not only because it was to become the increasingly dominant mode of philosophical expression in the imperialist age. Nietzsche had already acquired this status before the first imperialist world war, and he retained it even after the second.

He had a special sixth sense, an anticipatory sensitivity to what the parasitical intelligentsia would need in the imperialist gerg, what would inwardly move and disturb it, and what kind of answer would most appease it. Thus he was able to encompass very wide areas of culture, to illuminate the pressing questions with clever aphorisms, and to satisfy the frustrated, indeed sometimes rebellious instincts of this parasitical class of intellectuals with gestures that appeared fascinating and hyper-revolutionary.

And at the same time he could answer all these questions, or at least indicate the answers, in such a way that out of all his subtleties and fine ka, it was possible for the robust and reactionary class insignia of the imperialist bourgeoisie to emerge.

This Jekyll-and-Hyde character corresponds to the social existence, and hence to the emotional and intellectual world, of this class in a triple sense. Firstly, an oscillation between the most acute feeling for nuance, the keenest over sensitivity, and a suddenly erupting, often hysterical brutality is always an intrinsic sign of decadence. Secondly, it is very closely linked with a deep dissatisfaction concerning contemporary culture: He therefore waxes enthusiastic if the revolutionary character of his discontent receives a philosophical sanction, but is at the same time deflected — with regard to its social substance — into a rebuttal of democracy and oa.

This change manifested itself above all in a complacent, narcissistic, playful relativism, pessimism, nihilism, etc. But in the case of honest intellectuals, these often turned into sincere despair and a consequent mood of revolt Messianism, etc. Now as a diviner of the cultural psyche, as aesthetician and moralist, Nietzsche was perhaps the cleverest and most versatile exponent of this decadent self-knowledge.

Die Zerstörung der Vernunft der Weg des Irrationalismus von Schelling Zu Hitler

But his significance went further: For in the most spirited and vigilant intellectuals who succumbed to the influence of the decadent outlook, there ineluctably arose a desire to conquer it. Such a desire rendered the struggles of the burgeoning new class, the proletariat, extremely attractive for most of these intellectuals. Here, and particularly with regard to personal conduct and morality, they perceived auguries of a possible social recovery and, in connection with it — naturally this thought was uppermost — of their own recovery.


At the same time, the majority of the intellectuals had no inkling of the economic and social implications of a real socialist transformation. Since they contemplated it in purely ideological terms, they had no clear notion how far and how profoundly such a realignment would mean a radical break with their own class; or how such a break, once accomplished, would affect the lives of the persons concerned.

Confused though this movement may have been, it did embrace wide sections of the more advanced bourgeois intelligentsia.

Naturally enough, it revealed itself with particular vehemence in geprg of crisis for instance, the ban on socialists, the fate of Naturalism, the First World War and the Expressionist movement in Germany, boulangisme and the Dreyfus Affair in France, etc. It offered a road lukaccs avoided the need for razzon break, or indeed any serious conflict, with the bourgeoisie.

The road indicated by Nietzsche never departed from the decadence proliferating in the intellectual and emotional life of this class. But the new-found self-knowledge placed it in a new light: Like those sections of society at whom his work was aimed, Nietzsche himself was principally concerned with cultural problems, notably art and individual morality.

Mehring was quite right to point out that his arguments against socialism never surpassed the level of Leo, Treitschke, etc. We can see how great the temptation was right through the imperialist period. And it was by no means limited to the reactionary part of the intelligentsia. In the essence of their overall work, decidedly progressive writers like Heinrich and Thomas Mann or Bernard Shaw were equally prey to this influence.

Indeed it was even capable of making a strong impression on some Marxist intellectuals. Even Mehring — for the time being — assessed it as follows: But for such people, Nietzsche is only a transitional stage on the way to socialism. This rests on his undoubted philosophical abilities. But Nietzsche, as we shall see in more detail later, was able to enshrine and formulate in his works some of the most important lasting features of reactionary attitudes to the imperialist period, and to the age of world wars and revolutions.

To perceive his standing in this field, one has only to compare him with lukas contemporary, Eduard von Hartmann. This is why he at first enjoyed a much greater success than Nietzsche, and also why he fell into complete oblivion in the imperialist period. Certainly Nietzsche, as we have already noted, achieved everything in a mythicizing form.

This alone enabled him gazon comprehend and define prevailing tendencies because, lacking any understanding of capitalist economics, he tazon solely capable of observing, describing and expressing the symptoms of the superstructure. But the myth-form also results from the fact that Nietzsche, the leading philosopher of the imperialist reaction, did not live to see imperialism. Exactly like Schopenhauer as the philosopher of the bourgeois reactionaries afterhe wrote in an age that was nurturing only the first shoots and buds of what was to come.

For a thinker incapable of recognizing the real generative forces, these could only be portrayed in a utopian, mythical manner. True, his task was facilitated both by the expressive mode of myth and by its aphoristic form, whose characteristics we are about lukcs discuss.

There can be no doubt that such an intellectual anticipation betokens a not inconsiderable gift of observation, sense of the problematic, and capacity for abstraction. The two are also closely associated in the fundamental tenor of their philosophy. We shall refrain here from raising the historio-philological questions of influence, etc. Of course there exist differences between Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, growing ever deeper as Nietzsche clarified his efforts in the course of his development.

But they are more in the nature of differences of period: From Schopenhauer, however, Nietzsche took over the principle of the methodological coherence in his intellectual structure, merely modifying and extending it to suit the age and the opponent. It amounted to what we identified in our second chapter as the indirect apologetics of capitalism. Naturally this basic principle partly assumed new concrete forms in consequence of the conditions of a more acutely developed class struggle.